On Blocking Coalitions: Linking Mas-Colell with Grodal-Schmeidler-Vind by Greenberg, Joseph et al.
Hitotsubashi University Repository
Title
On Blocking Coalitions: Linking Mas-Colell with
Grodal-Schmeidler-Vind






RightDiscussion  paper  #2004-3 
 
 
































†Department of Economics, McGill University, Montreal, Canada. 
‡Department of Economics, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, 
USA, and CORE, Belgium. 
§Graduate Faculty of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, Japan. 
 On blocking coalitions: Linking Mas-Colell with
Grodal-Schmeidler-Vind¤
Joseph Greenbergy Shlomo Weberz Akira Yamazakix
August 2004
This paper was dedicated to the memory of Birgit Grodal, to whom the authors
owe an unlimited debt of gratitude. Her wisdom, guidance and friendship is
already so sorely missed. Sadly, during the writing of the paper we lost Karl
Vind, whose quiet and towering presence can never be replaced.
Abstract
In this paper we investigate the question of how many coalitions of a given relative
size would block a non-Warlasian allocation in large ¯nite economies. It is shown
that in ¯nite economies, if a Pareto optimal allocation is bounded away from being
Walrasian, then, for any two numbers ®;¯ between 0 and 1, the proportion of blocking
coalitions in the set of all coalitions with relative size between ® and ¯, is arbitrarily
close to 1
2, as the number of individuals in the economy becomes large.
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11 Introduction
It is well-known that in a ¯nite exchange economy the set of core allocations contains the
set of Walrasian (or competitive) allocations, and as the population of an economy gets
large core allocations become arbitrarily close to Walras allocations in an appropriate sense
(Debreu and Scarf [5], and Anderson [1]). Thus, for every allocation f, which is not in a
neighborhood of Walrasian allocations, there exists a (blocking) coalition S that, by means
of exchange, can improve upon the utility of every member of S generated by allocation
f. However, various communication, information, transportation, legal and institutional
constraints may put restrictions on coalition formation. As Grodal [9], p.581, points out:
\In reality the lack of communication restricts the set of coalitions that can be formed." In
light of this observation, an important question is, in addition to mere existence of a coalition
that blocks a given non-Walrasian allocation, is the number and composition of the set of
blocking coalitions.
An issue of a number of blocking coalitions was originally raised by Champsaur and
Laroque [4]. A more general treatment of the problem under smoothness assumptions has
been provided by Mas-Colell [14], who showed that in large ¯nite pure exchange economies,
nearly half of all coalitions block a Pareto optimal allocation which is \bounded away from
being Walrasian".1 Since Pareto optimality of a given allocation rules out the possibility of
being blocked by a coalition as well as its complement, the 50% of all coalitions represents
an upper bound on the number of blocking coalitions. Thus, the result of Mas-Colell implies
that if the number of individuals in an economy rises, the proportion of blocking coalitions
within the entire set of coalitions would approach this upper bound.
The important contribution by Mas-Colell [14], however, left open the question of the
size of blocking coalitions. The additional barriers to formation of coalitions of various
sizes, mentioned above, bring into the focus the question of a number of blocking coalitions
of di®erent sizes. One can immediately notice that, due to the property of the binomial
distribution, most coalitions consist of roughly half the individuals in the large ¯nite economy,
i.e., the proportion of individuals to the entire population in most coalitions is arbitrarily
close to one half. In other words, in large economies, under the uniform distribution on the
space of all coalitions, it is with probability arbitrarily close to one that a randomly chosen
coalition is of relative size close to one half. Therefore, loosely speaking, the size of most
coalitions is about one half of the population, and Mas-Colell's result actually states that
approximately half of these coalitions block a Pareto optimal allocation which is bounded
away from being Walrasian.
The focus of this paper is the study of the number of coalitions that contain a given
fraction of the agents and block a given Pareto optimal non-Warlasian allocation. It is natural
to address this question in the context of the limit variant of large ¯nite economies, namely
those with an atomless measure space of economic agents, introduced by Aumann [2]. In this
framework the core coincides with the set of Walrasian allocations (Aumann [2], Vind [19],
and Hildenbrand [10], [11]), and thus, for every non-Walrasian allocation there is a blocking
1See precise de¯nition below.
2coalition. This however still left open the question of the measure (or, the proportional
size to the population) of blocking coalitions. This issue has been examined by Grodal [9],
Schmeidler [18] and Vind [20]. These papers show that in an economy with an atomless
measure space of agents, for any positive " and any allocation which is not a Walrasian
allocation, there exists a blocking coalition whose proportional size to the population is
exactly ". Thus, \in particular, the formation of the coalition of all agents or any `large'
coalition is not needed to ensure the Pareto optimality of the ¯nal allocation" [18]. The main
goal of this paper is to provide the link between the results obtained within the framework
of large ¯nite and atomless economies concerning the existence and the number of blocking
coalitions. We show that for a Pareto optimal allocation which is bounded away from being
Walrasian, any two numbers ®;¯ representing the proportions to the entire population size
of an economy, the number of blocking coalitions with relative size between ® and ¯ is
arbitrarily close to one half of the total number of coalitions of that relative size.
Our result can be viewed as a generalization of the ¯nite analogue of the Grodal, Schmei-
dler and Vind contributions, who studied the existence of a blocking coalition whose size
is within a given range. We strengthen their results by showing that almost half of the
coalitions of a given proportional size will block. More speci¯cally, for small ¯'s and ® = 0
our result yields a generalization of the ¯nite analogue of Schmeidler's, while, for ® close to
¯, we obtain a considerable strengthening of the ¯nite version of Vind's.
Related literaure
The result of Mas-Colell [14] can be restated in an alternative manner: if one puts the
uniform distribution on the space of two coalition partitions of the set of all individuals
and chooses such a partition at random, then with probability one it contains a blocking
coalition. This conclusion has been generalized by Greenberg and Weber [8] who considered
partitions of all individuals into several coalitions. Under the uniform distribution on the
set of partitions that contain a given number J ¸ 2 of coalitions, Greenberg and Weber
[8] show that the probability of such a partition to contain a coalition that blocks a given
non-Walrasian allocation, is arbitrarily close to one. Another generalization of Mas-Colell's
result has been pursued by Yamazaki [21] who examined an extention of the notion of
the \distance" of allocations from being Walrasian. By introducing the concept of \Walras
degrees" Yamazaki [21] examined a wider class of non-Walrasian allocations and showed that
the basic result of Mas-Colell holds within this class as well. Greenberg and Weber [8] and
Kirman, Oddou and Weber [13] studied the number of blocking coalitions of a given absolute
size and showed that for a given size m, almost a half of all coalitions with m individuals
block a given non-Warlasian allocation when the number of agents in the economy increases.
Shitovitz [17] initiated the study of the number or the measure of blocking coalitions in
atomless exchange economies. To overcome the di±culty of counting the number or the
proportion of blocking coalitions in a combinatorial way in economies with an in¯nity of
agents, he analyzed economies with a ¯nite number of types and identi¯ed a coalition with
its type pro¯le. By considering pro¯les that represent coalitions with the same proportion
of types as in the whole economy, Shitovitz [17] proved a \local" result, that for every
3equal treatment Pareto optimal allocation which is not Walrasian, there is a ball in the
type pro¯le space around the given type pro¯le so that nearly half of the pro¯les in the
ball are blocking. Following the Shitovitz's approach, Graziano [7] investigated this problem
in atomless economies with a continuum of commodities by relying on the Rustichini and
Yannelis [16] equivalence result between the sets of core and Walrasian allocations in this
framework.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the model and the statement of the main
result along with some discussions are given. In Section 3 the statements of auxiliary results
are stated, and the proof of the main theorem is given using the auxiliary results, whose
proofs are provided in Appendix I. Finally, three lemmata which are used in our proofs are
collected in Appendix II.
2 The Model and the Main Result
We use a general equilibrium model with a di®erentiable framework as in Mas-Colell [15].
Commodities and Agents. There are a ¯nite number ` of commodities and a ¯nite set
N = f1;:::;ng of agents. The consumption set X of each agent is the interior of the
non-negative orthant of the `-dimensional Euclidean space (i.e., X = R`
++).
Preferences. For each agent i 2 N, the preference relation %i over X can be represented
by a utility function ui, which is twice continuously di®erentiable, strictly quasi-concave,
monotonic (hence, strictly monotonic) and whose upper contour sets do not cut the axis,
i.e., for every x 2 X the set fz 2 Xj ui(z) > ui(x)g is closed in R`
++. The set of all such
preferences is denoted by P.
Given %2 P, let p : X ! ¢ denote the continuously di®erentiable function which
associate's with every x 2 X the normalized supporting prices of the upper contour set, at















then the function p : X ! ¢ is given by p(x) = (1=kDu(x)k)Du(x), where u represents %.
(Note that strict monotonicity implies Du(x) À 0). We introduce a topology on P £ X as
we need to restrict our treatment to subsets of P £ X. Speci¯cally, we use the topology of
uniform convergence on compact sets of the p(¢) functions and their ¯rst partial derivatives,
and the space of consumption characteristics P £ X is endowed with the product topology.
An economy E is a mapping from the set N into the space P £ X. Every agent i 2 N
is fully characterized by the pair E(i) = (%i;ei), where %i 2 P is i's preferences and ei 2 X
is i's initial endowment. A coalition S is a nonempty subset of N. An allocation f for E is





i2S ei and g(i) Âi f(i) for all i 2 S.
An allocation f for E is Pareto optimal if it is not blocked by the grand coalition N.
We denote by PO(E) the set of Pareto optimal allocations for E. For every f 2 PO(E),
4the convexity of preferences yields the existence of supporting prices ¼(f) 2 ¢ such that
¼(f) = p(f(i)) for all i 2 N. An allocation f is said to be Walrasian if ¼(f)¢f(i) = ¼(f)¢ei
for all i.
Following [14], we de¯ne the deviation of f from being Walrasian by
dev(f) :=
sP

















Given a set of agents S, s denotes the absolute size (or the cardinality) of the set S,
whereas the relative size of S is de¯ned to be
s
n
. Throughout the rest of the paper we will
use upper case letters to denote sets of agents and lower case letters for the absolute size of
those sets.
For a given economy E and an allocation f for E, we de¯ne, for any 0 · ® < ¯ · 1,
S®¯(n) = fS ½ Nj ®n · s · ¯ng;
the set of all coalitions in the economy E whose relative size is at least ® and does not exceed
¯,
B®¯(n;E;f) = fS ½ S®¯(n)j S blocks fg;
the set of ALL coalitions of relative size between ® and ¯ that block the allocation f. Finally,





As alluded to in the introduction, the latter term is precisely the magnitude that we inves-
tigate. We can now state our main result:
Theorem 2.1 Let a compact set of consumption characteristics E ½ P £X and a compact
subset of the consumption set K ½ X be given. For any 0 · ® < ¯ · 1 and any 0 < " < 1
2,
there exists ± > 0 such that for any ¯nite set N with n agents, for any economy E : N ! E











That is, if a Pareto optimal allocation f : N ! K is not ±-Walrasian, then the proportion of
blocking coalitions of relative size between ® and ¯ di®ers from one half only by an arbitrarily
small " > 0.
5The above result shows that for all allocations which are bounded away from being Walrasian
and for every 0 · ® < ¯ · 1, ½®¯(N;E;f) is approximately 1
2 when the number of individuals
in the economy is large.
As we pointed out above, the relative size of most coalitions is close to 1
2. Therefore,
for ®;¯ with ® < 1
2 < ¯ ; Theorem 2.1 can be derived from [14].2 The main novelty of the
present paper is, therefore, the examination of the case of either \small" (0 · ® < ¯ · 1
2),
or \large" coalitions (1
2 · ® < ¯ · 1).
3 Proof of the Main Result
In order to prove the Theorem, we need the following three results which will be stated and
proved in Appendix I.
Proposition 3.1 Let E and K be as given in the Theorem. Then for any 0 < " < 1
2 and
any 0 · ® < ¯ · 1
2 , there exists a constant ± > 0 such that for any ¯nite set N, for any






Proposition 3.2 Let E and K be as given in the Theorem. Then for any 0 · " < 1
2 and
any 0 · ® < ¯ · 1
2 , there exists a constant ± > 0 such that for any ¯nite set N with
n agents, for any economy E : N ! K and any Pareto optimal allocation f : N ! K,



















The proofs of these three results will be given in Appendix I after the completion of the
proof of the main result. Thus, assuming the validity of the above claims we proceed to the
proof.
2For ® = 0 and ¯ = 1 it is precisely the Mas-Colell result.
6Proof of the Theorem
Let 0 < " < 1
2 be given. Let us show ¯rst that for every economy E, any Pareto optimal
allocation f and for every number 0 · ® < ¯ < 1
2
½®¯(n;E;f) + ½1¡¯;1¡®(n;E;f) · 1: (1)
Indeed, let S 2 B®¯(n;E;f). Since f is Pareto optimal, this means that S = N n S, the
complement of S does not block f, i.e., S 62 B1¡¯;1¡®(n;E;f), but, of course, S 2 S1¡¯;1¡®(n).
Therefore,
b®¯(n;E;f) + b1¡¯;1¡®(n;E;f) · maxfs®¯(n);s1¡¯;1¡®(n)g:
Finally, since s®¯(n) = s1¡¯;1¡®(n), the assertion follows.
If ¯ = 1
2, then (1) should be modi¯ed to



































In order to complete the proof of the Theorem, we distinguish between the following two
cases:
Case 1: Either 0 · ® < ¯ · 1
2 or 1
2 · ® < ¯ · 1.
By Propositions 3.1 and 3.2, we have ½®¯(n;E;f) > 1
2 ¡ " and ½1¡¯;1¡®(n;E;f) > 1
2 ¡ ".
(1) and (2) imply that for all n > n0, ½®¯(n;E;f) < 1
2 + ". Now, choose ± which is greater
than both the ± in Propositions 3.1 and 3.2, and also greater than 2kKk2p
n, where x 2 K
implies x · kKk. (Recall that K is compact.) It follows that for this ± , the Theorem holds.
(Note that, since p 2 ¢, dev(f) < ±
± p
n for n < n0.)
Case 2: Let 0 · ® < 1




2(n;E;f) ¡ s 1
2;1





2(n) + s 1
2;¯(n)
:















Applying (2) and (3) together with Case 1, the result follows. ¤
4 Appendix I
Since Proposition 3.3 is used in the proof of the two preceding propositions above, we begin
by proving it. For this purpose, we need the following two Lemmata:



























































Lemma 4.2 For all 0 · ® < ¯ · 1


























































Proof of Proposition 3.3
Let 0 · ® < ¯ · 1


























The last equality follows from (4). ¤
In order to prove Proposition 3.1, we ¯rst show the following:
Proposition 4.3 Let E and K be as given in the Theorem. Then, for any 0 < " < 1
2, and
any 0 < ® < ¯ · 1
2, there exists a constant ± > 0 such that for any ¯nite set N with n agents,






Proof Let N;E : N ! K;f : N ! K;0 < " < 1
2, and 0 < ® < ¯ · 1
2 be given. As in
[14], p.212, the constants a, G, r and · are determined. (See Lemmata 5.1 - 5.3 in Appendix
II). De¯ne ´;¸;t0;J;± (in this order) such that:
1
2
































Put °2 ´ dev(f)2, ¼ = ¼(f), fi = f(i), gi = ei ¡ fi (note that gi is the excess supply of
agenti) and M = fm 2 Z+j®n · m · ¯ng where Z+ is the set of nonnegative integers. For




































































































m =) S 2 B(n;E;f): (5)
(Note that for such a coalition
P

















By using (5), we obtain










To conclude the proof of the Proposition, it su±ces to show that the last term is greater
than 1
2 ¡ ". Now, as in [14], p.214, Lemma 5.2 immediately yields that
c
1
m ¸ 1 ¡ ¸ for all m 2 M : (7)
10In order to evaluate c2





















m ¡ 1: (8)



















+ 1 ¡ ©(t0):
































where m¤ is the value of m at which the minimum in (6) is attained. ¤
Proof of Proposition 3.1
We have to show that the assertion of Proposition 4.3 holds also for ® = 0. Let µ = ¯=2 < ¯.




implies ½µ¯(n;E;f) ¸ q for
some q > 1
















! 0 when n ! 1. Therefore, there exists n1 such that for all
n > n1, ½0¯(n;E;f) ¸ 1
2 ¡ ". Since fi 2 K, kfik · kKk for all i 2 N, and therefore,
dev(f) < 2kKk2. (Recall that ¼ 2 ¢). Choosing ± such that ± > maxf2kKk
p
n; ±0g,
completes the proof. ¤
Proposition 4.4 Let E and K be as given in the Theorem. Then, for any 0 < " < 1
2, and
any 0 < ® < ¯ · 1
2, there exists a constant ± > 0 such that for any ¯nite set N with n agents,






11Proof First note that the proof of Proposition 4.3 cannot be directly applied here, since
there we used the fact that m · 1






























































i2S ¼ ¢ gi · ¡°mt0
o
:
All the constants and notations are the same as in the proof of Proposition 4.3. Now, instead
of looking at a coalition S of relative size between 1¡¯ and 1¡®, we consider its complement
S whose relative size is, therefore, between ® and ¯, with ¯ · 1
2. The fact that
P
i2N gi = 0


















i2S ¼ ¢ gi = ¡
X
i2S ¼ ¢ gi
Using these relations, the proof of Proposition 4.3 yields that for all m 2 M
(i) S 2 C1
m \ C2








m ¸ 1 ¡ ¸
(iv) c
4










+ 1 ¡ ©(t0) ¸ ´

















Proof of Proposition 3.2
Again, the only case to be considered is ® = 0. The proof here is similar to the one given
for Proposition 3.1, but now using the second part of Proposition 3.3. ¤
125 Appendix II
We reproduce here the three Lemmata which were used in [14], and from which the constants
a;G;r and · are determined. Their original references are indicated and we point out the
particular choice of the sets in our case.
Lemma 5.1 Let E ½ P £ X be a compact set. There is a > 0 such that for all (%;e) 2 E,
x 2 X, and y 2 R`, if kxk < kKk and p ¢ y 6= 0, then
x +
®p ¢ y
kyk2 y Â x;
where p = p(x).
See Mas-Colell [14], p.211.
Lemma 5.2 Let ¡ ½ R` be nonempty and compact. There are constants G > 0 and r > 0
such that if yi 2 ¡;i 2 N;#N = n, and
P
























See Hoe®ding [12], Th:1, Section 6. The set ¡ used in our paper is:
¡ = f(x ¡ e)jx 2 K and there exists %2 P such that (%;e) 2 Eg
(and of course, yi = fi ¡ ei;i 2 N).
Lemma 5.3 Let ¡ ½ R be nonempty and compact. Then there is a constant · > 0 such
that if di 2 ¡;i 2 N;
P































i2N di < °mt
o
and ©(t) be the normal (0;1) distribution, we have






See Bikelis [3]. The set ¡ used for the application to our context is
¡ = fp(x ¡ e)jp 2 ¢;x 2 K; and there exists %2 P such that (%;e) 2 Eg
(and, of course, di = ¼ ¢ fi ¡ ¼ ¢ ei;i 2 N).
13References
[1] Anderson, R., D. (1978), An elementary core equivalence theorem, Econometrica 46,
1483{1487.
[2] Aumann, R., J. (1964), Markets with a continuum of traders, Econometrica 32, 39{50.
[3] Bikelis, A.(1969), On evaluation of the residual term in the Central Limit Theorem for
drawings from a ¯nite set (in Russian), Studia Scientiarum Mathematicarum Hungarica,
345{354.
[4] Champsaur, P. and G.Laroque (1971), Notes sur les mechanismes de blocage, Unpub-
lished mansucript (Paris).
[5] Debreu, G., and H. Scarf (1963), A limit theorem on the core of an economy, International
Economic Review 4, 235{246.
[6] Feller, W. (1968), An introduction to probability theory and its applications, Vol.1, 3rd
Edition, Wiley, New York.
[7] Graziano, M.G. (2003), Measuring the number of blocking coalitions in in¯nite dimen-
sional economies, Decisions in Economics and Finance.
[8] Greenberg, J. and S. Weber (1983), A core equivalence theorem with an arbitrary com-
munication structure, Journal of Mathematical Economics 11, 43{55.
[9] Grodal, B. (1972), A second remark on the core of an atomless economy, Econometrica
40, 581{583.
[10] Hildenbrand, W. (1968), The core of an economy with a measure space of economic
agents, Review of Economic Studies 35, 443{452.
[11] Hildenbrand, W. (1974), Core and Equilibria of a Large Economy, Princeton: Princeton
Universitty Press.
[12] Hoe®ding, W. (1963), Probability inequalities for sums of bounded random variables,
Journal of the American Statistical Association 58, 13-30.
[13] Kirman, A., C. Oddou and S. Weber (1986), Stochastic communication and coalition
formation, Econometrica 54, 129{138.
[14] Mas-Colell, A. (1978), A note on the core equivalence theorem: how many blocking
coalitions are there?, Journal of Mathematical Economics 5, 207{215.
[15] Mas-Colell, A. (1985), The Theory of General Economic Equilibrium: A Di®erentiable
Approach, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, U.K.
[16] Rustichini, A. and N.C. Yannelis (1991), Edgeworth's conjecture in economies with a
continuum of agents and commodities, Journal of Mathematical Economics 20, 307{326.
14[17] Shitovitz, B. (1983), The proportion of blocking coalitions in atomless economies, Jour-
nal of Mathematical Economics 12, 247{255.
[18] Schmeidler, D. (1972), A remark on the core of an atomless economy, Econometrica 40,
579{580.
[19] Vind, K. (1964), Edgewoth-allocations in an exchange economy with many traders,
International Economic Review 4, 235{246.
[20] Vind, K. (1973), A third remark on the core of an atomless economy, Econometrica 40,
585{586.
[21] Yamazaki, A. (1984), Walras degrees and probability of a blocking coalition at Pareto
allocations, Journal of Mathematical Economics 12, 105{121.
15